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IO file

7 May 1954

Training Liaison Structure

The Inspector General's Survey Report includes pertinent observations regarding the stature, functions, qualifications and utilization of personnel designated variously by the several Offices and DD/P Senior Staffs and Area Divisions as Training Officers or Training Liaison Officers (page 36, paragraph 1). The Report offers also certain conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the Clandestine Services Training Committee (page 39, paragraph 23) and certain recommendations for achieving in DD/P more effective development and enforcement of training policy (page 41, paragraph 16).

From its inception, the Office of Training has been guided by the principles that:

a. Training and the Agency intelligence effort are interdependent and mutually supporting; and,

b. The closest relationship must be maintained between the Office of Training and the principal components of the Agency in order to satisfy the total training requirements of the Agency.

A strong and effective structure for training liaison is obviously an essential element in the attainment of the training objectives of CIA.

It is the opinion of this Office that the existing structure for training liaison between the Office of Training and other components of the Agency has been chiefly effective for handling the matters of enrollment in courses, dissemination of course announcements and schedules and similar matters largely routine in nature. The existing structure has been least effective in connection with training problems of greatest significance such as:

a. Identification of substantive requirements for training of personnel to perform effectively the various tasks assigned the various components;

b. Identification of numerical requirements for training of personnel;

c. Marshaling of both substantive and numerical requirements as a basis for sound planning and management by the Office of Training and in order that adequately trained personnel can be made available in each component in numbers sufficient to assure its ability to satisfy its missions;

d. Development and enforcement of policies that will guarantee that personnel to be charged with particular tasks or functions receive training prerequisite to such assignment.

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JOB NO. 3 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/REV COORD. TO: 10 S
NEXT REV DATE: 8 Nov 79
NO. PGE 4 CLEVERLY DAY
REV CLASS C REV COORD. - AUTH: EH 703

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Approved For Release 2000/05/03 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000200010003-9

It is believed that shortcomings of the existing structure for training liaison cannot be attributed to any one cause. Although the significance of each varies in different components of the Agency, the following are principal causes for failures in the training liaison structure:

a. Training Officers are not of sufficient stature in their component to exercise directive force and insure adequate planning;

b. Training Officers are not qualified in the substantive work of their component;

c. Personnel holding full-time administrative positions are designated as Training Officers as an additional duty.

Therefore, the Office of Training concurs in the recommendations that DD/P have a senior, substantively qualified operations officer as DD/P Training Officer responsible to and representing Chief of Operations, DD/P; that such Officer should be concerned solely with planning and policy determinations regarding the training of Clandestine Services personnel; and that such Officer should be supported by the existing Clandestine Services Training Committee.

It is the opinion of the Office of Training that the effectiveness of training liaison with the DD/I would be substantially increased by establishment of a structure within DD/I similar to that recommended for DD/P. It is recommended, therefore, that DD/I be encouraged to appoint a senior, substantively qualified intelligence officer as full-time DD/I Training Officer, responsible to and representing DD/I; that such Officer should be concerned solely with planning and policy determinations regarding the training of DD/I personnel; that such Officer should be supported by an Intelligence Training Committee made up of the Training Officers of the several Offices of DD/I; that Training Officers of the Offices of DD/I be appointed from among senior substantively qualified intelligence officers.

It is believed that DD/A would profit, though to a lesser extent, by establishment of a training liaison structure similar to those recommended for DD/P and DD/I.

The Jackson Committee (The President's Committee on International Information Activities) Report of 30 June 1953 recommended, in part, that CIA give higher priority to training even though such a policy might reduce current capabilities. One practical method of assigning a "higher priority" to training is by strengthening the training liaison structure as recommended herein.

Approved For Release 2000/05/03 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000200010003-9

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Approved For Release 2000/05/03 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000200010003-9 *file*

OTR Facilities for Training Personnel from Other Agencies

One conclusion of the Inspector General's Report of Survey is that "the facilities of the Office of Training could be used to a greater extent in training personnel from other intelligence agencies." (page 38, paragraph 14)

Attached herewith is a statistical table indicating the extent to which the facilities of the Office of Training have been utilized for the training of personnel of other intelligence agencies during 1953 and 1954 to date. These data indicate that other intelligence agencies did not fully utilize Office of Training facilities made available to them during 1953.

It will be noted that none of the Agency facilities for clandestine operations training have been used by other intelligence agencies. All of such training is offered and conducted on the "need-to-know" basis. Consideration for the security of Agency clandestine objectives and techniques and for the security of operations personnel participating in such training, both as instructors and as students, suggests that it may not be proper for existing clandestine operations facilities of the Office of Training to be used for training personnel of other intelligence agencies.

The following requirements for development of special courses for intelligence personnel of other agencies have been received in the Office of Training:

a. State Department Program -

(Larry to develop)

b. Program for Department of Defense Personnel -

(Larry to develop)

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It is recommended that in utilization of facilities of the Office of Training, first priority be given to Agency training requirements and that consistent with such priority and applicable security requirements, other intelligence agencies be encouraged to utilize the existing training facilities of the Office of Training.

It is further recommended that those requirements for training intelligence personnel of other intelligence agencies which necessitate the development of special courses be done on a second priority basis.

Approved For Release 2000/05/03 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000200010003-9

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	<u>ARMY</u>		<u>NAVY</u>		<u>AIR</u>		<u>STATE</u>		<u>NSA</u>		<u>JOINT STAFF</u>	
	Q	A	Q	A	Q	A	Q	A	Q	A	Q	A
<u>1953</u>												
INDOCTRINATION	250	26	250	1	250	162	-	1	-	-	-	-
ORIENTATION	24	24	24	24	22	22	19	19	-	-	12	12
BIC(I)	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	1	-	-
READING IMPROVE- MENT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RESERVE INTELLI- GENCE OFFICERS (ACTIVE DUTY)	25	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>1954</u>												
INDOCTRINATION	250	30	250	93	250	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
ORIENTATION	-	10	-	8	-	10	-	10	-	-	-	-
BIC(I)	6	1	6	0	6	2	6	2	6	3	-	5
READING IMPROVE- MENT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
RESERVE INTELLI- GENCE OFFICERS (ACTIVE DUTY)	25	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Q - Quota

A - Actual Attendance

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